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RESUMEN
En los 1940s, cuando el Gobernador de Puerto Rico era au´n designado
por el Presidente de EEUU, se construyo´ un gran sector pu´blico empresarial.
Ma´s tarde, en 1948-1950, el primer gobierno electo de la isla privatizo´ esas
empresas. Este trabajo documenta la creacio´n de empresas pu´blicas y su pri-
vatizacio´n en Puerto Rico, y analiza el papel desempen˜ado en la privatizacio´n
por la ideologı´a, los intereses polı´ticos y las motivaciones econo´micas. Mientras
que factores ideolo´gicos pudieron ser importantes en la creacio´n del sector
pu´blico empresarial, en la privatizacio´n jugaron un papel clave factores
econo´micos como la superior eficiencia de la empresa privada competidora
en el sector de cemento, y las continuas pe´rdidas experimentadas en el resto
de empresas manufactureras pu´blicas.
Palabras clave: empresa pu´blica; privatizacio´n; polı´tica industrial;
Puerto Rico
1. INTRODUCTION
Most economics and public policy scholars consider the privatisations in
Chile (1970s-early 1980s) and the United Kingdom (1980s-early 1990s) to be
the first privatisation policies in modern history (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998,
p. 115). Others argue that the first privatisation operation was the denational-
isation of steel in the United Kingdom in 1953 (Burk 1988), and a few
scholars see the partial sales of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Germany
under Adenauer’s government (late 1950s-early 1960s) as the first large-scale
privatisation programme (Megginson 2005, p. 15; Schipke 2001, p. 50).
However, recently published works have documented and analysed a large-
scale privatisation policy between 1934 and 1937 in Germany, under Hitler’s
government (Bel 2006, 2010). Another recent study has examined a large-
scale privatisation under Mussolini’s first government in Fascist Italy,
between 1922 and 1925 (Bel forthcoming).
Contemporary economic analyses of privatisation have so far neglected
an important, early case of large-scale privatisation: the one carried out by
the first democratically elected governor of Puerto Rico in the late 1940s,
which appears to have been the first large-scale privatisation policy imple-
mented in a democratic regime1. A number of studies of industrial and
1 I am aware of one previous privatisation operation (with transfer of full control to the private
sector) implemented by a democratic government: in 1928, the Australian government sold a fleet
of cargo ships that had been purchased during the World War I (Neville 1950, pp. 18-19).
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administrative policy in Puerto Rico in the 1950s (Chase 1951; Ojuda 1954;
Ross 1957; Baer 1959; Lewis 1955) and 1960s (Goodsell 1965; Ross 1966)
noted the sale of SOEs between 1948 and 19502. However, none of these
works provided an analysis of the process or the objectives of the privatisa-
tion policy implemented. Indeed, providing an analysis of the process and
the objectives is the main contribution of this study.
Within 2 years of the first democratic gubernatorial election in Puerto
Rico in 1948, the government of the Partido Popular Democra´tico (PPD;
Democratic Popular Party) had privatised all the state-owned manufacturing
firms. These firms belonged to a wide range of sectors: cement, glass, shoes,
paper and chalkboard and clay products. The enterprises transferred to the
private sector had been created during the 1940s in an attempt to promote
industrialisation, and had been managed by the island’s government. The
nationalisation of existing public services companies (such as water, trans-
port and energy) and the creation of SOE sectors was an important policy in
Puerto Rico in the early 1940s.
Nationalisation and the expansion of the SOE sector were common in
other countries during the decade, but Puerto Rico was alone in reversing the
trend and developing a policy of privatisation of state-owned firms in the late
1940s. In fact, in the post-war period, no other country engaged in such a
policy until 1959, when Germany embarked on a privatisation programme3.
Hence, a central question remains to be answered: why did the Puerto Rican
government depart from the mainstream policies regarding state ownership
in the post-World War II era, by privatising state-owned firms?
Answering these questions requires an analysis of the objectives of the
country’s privatisation scheme. This paper intends to fill a gap in the eco-
nomic literature by tracing the course of privatisation in 1948-1950 Puerto
Rico through a study of: (1) Mun˜oz Marı´n’s personal archive (accessible after
the Fundacio´n Luis Mun˜oz Marı´n was created in 1980)4; and (2) the doc-
umentation of the Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company, which only
became available when it was donated to the Fundacio´n Luis Mun˜oz Marı´n
in December 2008. The analysis of privatisation in Puerto Rico suggests
that the objectives pursued by the island’s government were mostly related
(F’note continued)
This operation, which was in fact a reprivatisation, was an isolated measure and it was not
implemented within the framework of a wide privatisation policy.
2 Ross’s (1966) account is briefly followed in a study by Dietz (1986, pp. 215-216) when
describing the basic characteristics of the sale of state-owned firms. Dietz does not add any original
research or further analysis.
3 Although on a smaller scale than that applied in Puerto Rico, only three firms were partially
privatised: Preussag in 1959, Volkswagen in 1961 and VEBA in 1965 (Schipke 2001, p. 50).
4 Within Mun˜oz Marin’s personal archive held by the Fundacio´n Luis Mun˜oz Marı´n, the
following sources have been particularly useful: section IV, series 2 ((a) personal correspondence;
(b) data and statistics)); section V, series 16 (statistics and economic reports).
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to economic concerns. One key factor was the poor performance of the
manufacturing SOEs; another was the desire to enhance Puerto Rico’s ability
to attract private capital (particularly from continental United States) to
invest in industries. In contrast, fiscal objectives do not seem to have been an
important issue in the decision to privatise, nor did strong ideological or
political motivations play a significant role.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. First (section 2), the building
of the Puerto Rican SOE sector is documented. Next (section 3), the privati-
sation process and its results are examined. After this (section 4), an analysis of
the objectives of the privatisation policy is presented. Finally, (section 5) the
main conclusions are drawn.
2. THE BUILDING OF THE SOE SECTOR
In September 1941, Rexford G. Tugwell was appointed governor of Puerto
Rico. A former professor at Columbia University, Tugwell had served as
undersecretary in the Department of Agriculture in Roosevelt’s first New
Deal government. At that time, he had visited Puerto Rico, and on his return,
in April 1934, he prepared a report for President Roosevelt. Tugwell’s view of
the transformation of Puerto Rico was that industrialisation would not occur
unless the government took the initiative. This continued to be his approach
when he became governor in 1941. Throughout his tenure, he made con-
certed efforts to promote a policy of government-induced industrialisation
(Tugwell 1953, p. 147). Tugwell made his intentions very clear in his earliest
speeches to the Puerto Rican Legislature (Tugwell 1942, p. 58).
On 18 November 1941, Tugwell appointed Teodoro Moscoso as coordi-
nator of the island’s affairs. Moscoso was to play a crucial role in the
industrialisation programme soon to begin. To improve Tugwell’s relation-
ship with the Puerto Rican Legislature, he forged an alliance with Luis
Mun˜oz Marı´n (Maldonado 1965, p. 3; Goldsmith et al. 1974, p. 144; Carr
1984, pp. 65-66), who had obtained the powerful position of president of the
Senate (the highest post that a Puerto Rican politician could hold) after the
November 1940 election. In the 1940 electoral campaign, Mun˜oz Marı´n’s
PPD had pledged to place primary emphasis on issues related to economic
reform, instead of the traditional discussion of the island’s political status. A
majority in the Legislature was in favour of economic reform5 and Tugwell
was able to pass the legislation required to create the legal framework for
the government-led industrialisation policy. The key step was the approval
by Act no. 188 (11 May 1942) of the Law of the Development Company,
5 However, the margin of the PPD’s victory in 1940 was narrow: it had a majority of just one
vote in the Senate. Data on Senatorial and Representative districts have been obtained from the
Biblioteca Virtual de Puerto Rico (http://eleccionespuertorico.org/mapas/index_es.html, accessed on
2 June 2009).
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according to which «wide authorization to go into business was provided»
(Tugwell 1947, p. 263).
The Puerto Rico Development Company (PRDC henceforth; in 1946, it
was renamed the Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company, PRIDCO
thereafter) was organised along the lines of the Chilean Development
Company, which had been created several years before (Moscoso 1953, p. 60).
Moscoso was appointed general manager of PRDC on 30 September 1942, and
the company began operating in October. Its first (and most important) factory
was Cementos de Puerto Rico (the Puerto Rico Cement Company), with assets of
around U.S.$2,000,000 (PRDC 1944, p. 30). The government’s common stock
participation in this venture6 was transferred to PRDC in 1943 (Descartes 1950,
p. 4), and thereafter the federal participation was paid in full out of the profits
(Moscoso 1953, p. 60).
In addition to PRDC, two other key agencies for the development pro-
gramme were created in 1942: the Puerto Rico Planning Board and the
Government Development Bank. Other sector-related agencies were created
between 1941 and 1945 (Baer 1959, p. 647): The Water Resources Authority,
the Transportation Authority, the Communications Authority, the Insular
Sewerage Service and the Puerto Rico Aqueduct Service7. This put in place
the institutional framework needed to develop the policy of government-led
industrialisation.
All public enterprises were organised as independent public corporations;
they were legally incorporated (thus placed outside the bureaucracy) and
intended to be financially self-sufficient (Goodsell 1965, p. 183). In line with
this modern approach to public management of commercial firms, Moscoso
worked hard to make PRDC’s operations profitable, and soon demanded that
services that were provided free should be separated from the company’s
general services8.
In the following years, the newly created agencies took over several
privately owned utilities. In January 1944, the Puerto Rico Water Resource
Authority took over the Puerto Rico Railway Light and Power Company and
the Mayagu¨ez Light Power and Ice Company, bringing all electric power
utilities in Puerto Rico under its control (Richardson 1947, p. 113). Later, the
Transportation Authority took over the urban transport system in San Juan.
This policy closely resembled those applied in many U.S. states and muni-
cipalities in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a period characterised by a
progressively greater involvement of governments in the delivery of local
services (Go´mez-Iba´n˜ez 2003).
6 Puerto Rico Cement Co. had begun operations in 1939, becoming the island’s largest indus-
trial factory.
7 These last two concerns merged in 1945 forming the Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (Goodsell,
1965, p. 189).
8 Moscoso, Letter to Rexford Tugwell, 30 June 1945. Mun˜oz Marı´n publicly endorsed Moscoso’s
view in a speech broadcast on 20 August 1945 (Mun˜oz Marı´n 2005, p. 87).
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What was exceptional in the Puerto Rican policy of the 1940s was the fact
that the PRDC created new manufacturing plants, which were built and run
by the following government corporations:
> The Puerto Rico Glass Corporation (PR Glass, henceforth) was
incorporated on 24 February 1943 (PRDC 1944, p. 13). The construc-
tion of the factory began in May 1943 and glass production began in
January 1945, but stopped because of a strike between 25 February
and 25 June 1945 (PR Government 1945, p. 30). Production resumed
after the strike.
> The Puerto Rico Pulp and Paper Corporation (PR Pulp and Paper,
henceforth) was organised on 23 April 1944 (PRDC 1944, p. 13).
Construction began in May 1944 and the production of paperboard
began on 6 May 1946 (PR Government 1946, p. 39).
> The Puerto Rico Clay Products Corporation (PR Clay Products,
henceforth) was created on 6 November 1944 (PRDC 1944, p. 13);
the preliminary work for building the clay products factory was
completed by June 1945. The first kiln was completed in May 1947 and
production of brick and hollow tiles began in August 1947.
> The Puerto Rico Shoe and Leather Corporation (PR Shoe and Leather,
henceforth) was incorporated in January 1946. The plant opened
(although construction was still incomplete) on 1 July 1946 and
commercial operations began in February 1947.
> Telares de Puerto Rico, inc. (PR Telares, henceforth) was incorporated in
1946 and work was scheduled to start before the end of 1946 (PR
Government 1946, p. 38). However, the plant to be managed by PR
Telares was never built, and this subsidiary was dissolved in June 19519.
Table 1 provides details of PRIDCO’s six subsidiary corporations. In most
cases, actual investment was much higher than had initially been expected.
According to Descartes (1950, p. 31), total direct investment of PRIDCO in
the subsidiary plants until 30 June 1949 was U.S.$11.1 million (133.1 million
in 2010 U.S.$), a large financial commitment. Table 2 displays information
on the production and workforce of the subsidiaries in the final years of the
1940s, when all plants (but PR Telares) had begun commercial operations.
PRIDCO plants required large investments, but they employed relatively
few workers: in June 1948, when all plants were in operation, the total
workforce was only 992 employees10. In fact, the creation of the manufacturing
state-owned sector seems to have had a minimal effect on industrial employ-
ment, far below what an effective industrialisation policy for the island might
9 The total deficit accumulated until PR Telares was liquidated was U.S.$86,000 (PRIDCO,
1951, p. 27).
10 Moscoso, Letter to Luis Mun˜oz Marı´n, 24 June 1948.
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TABLE 1
PRIDCO MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS: ORGANISATION, OPERATIONS AND
INITIAL INVESTMENT
Corporation
Date of
organisation
Beginning of
commercial
operations
Expected
investment
(U.S.$)
Actual initial
investment
(U.S.$)
Actual initial
investment
(U.S.$ 2010)
Puerto Rico
Cement
February
1938a
January 1939 n.a. 1,500,000 23,423,531
Puerto Rico
Glass
February
1943
January 1945 2,000,000 3,026,000 39,172,057
Puerto Rico Pulp
and Paper
April 1944 May 1946 1,200,000 1,504,436 18,907,928
Puerto Rico Clay
Products
November
1944
August 1947 247,505 1,140,595 14,012,837
Puerto Rico Shoe
& Leather
January
1946
February
1947
n.a. 319,247 3,837,696
Telares de Puerto
Rico
Early 1946 Never – 86,000b 1,033,813
n.a.: not available.
Notes: aThe Cement plant was acquired by PRDC in 1943, with assets close to U.S.$2,000,000.
bThe amount for Telares de Puerto Rico Inc. is the deficit accumulated by 30 June 1951.
Sources: Author’s own data, based on: (a) PRDC (1944); (b) PRIDCO (1947 and 1951); (c) PR
government (1945 and 1946). U.S.$ 2010: author’s computation based on CIP indexes of Bureau of Labor
Statistics (U.S. Department of Labor).
TABLE 2
PRIDCO MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS: PRODUCTION (JULY-JUNE) AND
WORKFORCE
Corporation 1946-1947 1947-1948 1948-1949
Work force
(June 1948)
Puerto Rico Cement (barrels of cement) 805,393 949,278 1,028,463 156
Puerto Rico Glass (tons of glass packed) 12,900 7,557 18,387 176
Puerto Rico Pulp and Paper (tons) 5,365 3,293 5,980 173
Puerto Rico Clay Products (tons) – n.a.b n.a.b 205
Puerto Rico Shoe & Leather (pairs of
shoes)
74,700a 245,456 316,083 282
Notes: aProduction of shoes began in February 1947.
bProduction of clay products began in August 1947. Given the heterogeneity of the corporation’s
outputs, it is not possible to provide an overall figure for annual production.
Sources: Author’s own data, based on PRIDCO (1947, 1948, 1949). Workforce: Moscoso, Letter to Luis
Mun˜oz Marı´n, 24 June 1948.
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have been expected to achieve. Because most PRIDCO plants were capital
intensive, their workforce represented only 1.6 per cent of the island’s employ-
ment in manufacturing11.
3. PRIVATISATION OF THE STATE-OWNED MANUFACTURING FIRMS
On 12 February 1946, Tugwell delivered his last governor’s message to the
Legislature. Tugwell (1947, p. 49) concluded as follows:
«It is with some emotion that I tell you at the opening of this regular
session of my approaching departurey. I have already noted some of
the credits, the largest being the program for economic rehabilitation
which has been begun. And next, perhaps, the public ownership and
operation of public utilities.»
The 46th annual report (1945-1946) was the last one delivered by Tugwell,
who was replaced shortly afterwards by Jesu´s T. Pin˜ero, the first native
governor of Puerto Rico.
Pin˜ero was the last governor to be appointed by the U.S. president.
Interestingly, Mun˜oz Marı´n — still president of the Senate at the time — had
been offered the governorship, but he preferred to wait until the first
gubernatorial election, scheduled for November 1948. Following Mun˜oz
Marı´n’s suggestion, Pin˜ero, a PPD member, was appointed to the office. In
any case, thereafter Mun˜oz Marı´n held total command of the executive
power in Puerto Rico, adding this to the full control the PPD had obtained
over the Legislature. Whereas the PPD had won the 1940 election to the
Legislature by a very narrow margin, the 1944 election had produced the
largest victory in the history of Puerto Rico: the PPD took all seven Senatorial
districts and thirty-four of the thirty-five Representative districts, thus gaining
full control of the Legislature.
Together with these institutional changes, the economic environment had
also changed dramatically after the end of the World War II. Maritime trans-
portation and trade in the Caribbean Sea progressively returned to normal, thus
increasing the competition facing the commercial products manufactured
in the island. This change was of great importance. The decision to establish
a state-owned manufacturing sector had been taken within the pre-war and
wartime context, when the growing tension and subsequent hostilities pro-
foundly affected maritime transportation and commerce in the Caribbean,
particularly between 1942 and 1944. Hence, most government-owned manu-
facturing firms had been designed to supply the local market (Moscoso 1953,
11 In 1948, 64,085 workers were employed in manufacturing (excluding home needlework
(PRIDCO, 1949, p. 4)).
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p. 61); by the time all five subsidiaries were finally in full commercial operation
in 1947, the market conditions on the island had changed dramatically. In
addition, technical and commercial problems had seriously affected the per-
formance of some of the subsidiaries, especially the PR Pulp and Paper Co., and
the PR Shoe and Leather Co12.
The Puerto Rican government followed these developments closely, and
expressed its official views in the annual reports to the Legislature (see Table 3).
Tugwell’s reports (1941-1946) had supported the increasing role of the gov-
ernment in manufacturing. Projects were expanding each year, and emphasis
was placed on the development of the factories. The reports also mentioned the
difficulties caused by labour conflicts and the extra costs of investments.
The 47th report (1946-1947), delivered by Pin˜ero, differed little from the
last one presented by Tugwell. However, the following report (that of 1947-
1948) explicitly stated that PRIDCO had turned its attention to two important
aspects of the long-term programme: encouragement of private industrial
enterprise, and the development of tourism as a source of income for the
island. Publicly managed manufacturing firms received much less attention
in the report, thus providing a clear signal that a reorientation of the
development policy was underway.
Interestingly, the 49th report (1948-1949), the first delivered by Mun˜oz
Marı´n, openly admitted that selling the PR Pulp and Paper Co. to private
interests could be a solution for its problems. In his second governor’s report
(50th, 1949-1950), Mun˜oz Marı´n emphasised that the PR Shoe and Leather
Co. had been privatised, that most PRIDCO plants were operating at a loss
and that profits were falling in the only profitable firm, the PR Cement Co.
The question of privatisation had irreversibly entered the fray.
Although contemporary studies claimed that 1948 was the year in which the
decision to sell the subsidiaries was first made (Ross 1966, p. 111), the possi-
bility of privatisation was already being discussed by PRIDCO in mid-1947. At a
meeting of the PRIDCO Planning and Executive Committees held on 30 May
1947, Moscoso reported on negotiations held during a recent trip to the United
States regarding the transfer of the shoe factory to a private firm:
«2. Shoe factory — It was reported that Mr. Weinbrot of Mercury Foot-
wear reiterated the firm’s willingness to consider renting the company’s
shoe factory. The President [Moscoso] stated that a letter to that effect
should be obtained from Mr. Weinbrot but that it would be preferable to
negotiate along these lines with either Penaljo or Joyce, two other
reputable shoe manufacturers of apparently higher standards.»13
12 Moscoso (1953, p. 61) and Ross (1966, pp. 64-73) provide accounts of the problems faced by
these subsidiaries.
13 PRIDCO, Minutes of the meeting. Mun˜oz Marı´n was well aware of this, as a copy of these
minutes was sent to him, as usual.
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TABLE 3
THE SOE SECTOR IN PUERTO RICAN GOVERNORS’ AR
Report Governor SOEs in the governor’s AR Emphasis
43rd AR
1943
Tugwell PR Glass Co. is already underway.
Expected investment is U.S.$2,000,000.
Other projects under consideration:
(1) plant for the manufacture of wall
board; (2) textile mill; (3) hosiery
knitting mill; (4) paper mill; (5) yeast
plants; (6) plant for the production of
edible oils and fats and laundry soaps
Ambitious projects
for building publicly
operated plants
44th AR
1944
Tugwell Virtual completion of the glass container
plant, with a total investment of
U.S.$2,276,890. Creation of the PR Pulp
and Paper Co., and the beginning of
construction of a paper mill in May 1944.
Expected cost to be U.S.$1,200,000
Cost of the glass
container plant 14%
above expectations
45th AR
1945
Tugwell Glass production began in January 1945; a
strike in February stopped production for
86 days. Building of the paperboard mill
was repeatedly held up by delays in
delivery of construction material and
machinery; total capital stock issued
amounted to U.S.$1,325,000. The PR Clay
Products Co. was organised late in 1944;
funds available for use amount to
U.S.$247,504.75. Plans under considera-
tion by the Research and Development
Department include plants for making
wallboard, cotton cloth, food yeast, shoes,
vegetable oils and meat packing
Paper mill costs
more than 10%
above expected.
Problems in glass
production and
paper plant
construction.
Nevertheless,
ambitious plans to
be implemented
46th AR
1946
Tugwell By the end of the fiscal year, PRIDCO
had six subsidiary corporations: PR
Glass Co., PR Cement Co., PR Pulp and
Paper Co., PT Clay Products Co., PR
Shoes and Lather Co., and Telares de
PR. Glass, Cement and Pulp and Paper
were in operation, Clay, and Shoes
and Leather were under construction;
construction of Telares was expected to
start by the end of 1946
Three subsidiaries
working, and two
plants being built.
Construction of
Telares scheduled
47th AR
1947
Pin˜ero The PR Shoe and Leather Co. went
into operation, and the subsidiary to
manufacture heavy clay products had
Four subsidiaries
working, and one
plant to begin
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TABLE 3 (Cont.)
successful test-runs. All of the foregoing
contributes to the fulfillment of the basic
programme approved by the island’s
government when the PRDC was founded
in 1942. To achieve this, the company has
developed basic industries such as
cement, glass, clay products, paper and
shoes. The Company has scheduled
construction of a new textile mill in
Ponce, which will employ more than
500 persons, and has contracted for the
building of a yeast pilot plant capable of
producing 1,000 pounds of dry yeast daily
commercial
operations soon.
Basic PRDC
programme
completed.
Construction of
Telares scheduled
48th AR
1948
Pin˜ero PRIDCO has laid special emphasis on
two important aspects of the long-term
programme: encouragement of private
industrial enterprise and the development
of tourism as a source of income.
More emphasis on
promoting private
industrial firms
49th AR
1949
Mun˜oz
Marı´n
The PRIDCO programme began with the
acquisition of a cement plant, and later
the creation of four other industrial
plants, three of which showed signs of
becoming profitable ventures. PR Glass,
PR Clay, PR Shoe and Leather, and PR
Pulp and Paper all operated at a loss. The
solution to the difficulties of this plant
(Pulp and Paper) appeared to be either to
adapt it to the manufacture of cardboard
or to sell it to private interests who would
make an integrated enterprise
Privatisation of PR
Pulp and Paper Co.
envisaged as a likely
solution for its
difficulties
50th AR
1950
Mun˜oz
Marı´n
During the year Joyce of Puerto Rico, a
subsidiary of Joyce Inc. of California,
leased the PRIDCO’s shoe factory at
Ponce. The PR Clay Co. and the PR Glass
Co. operated at a loss. Production by the
Cement Corporation was interrupted by
a 50-day strike, which caused a sharp
drop in earnings. The plant had a net
profit of U.S.$758,000 compared with
U.S.$1,271,000 in the previous year
PR Shoe and Leather
Co. privatised. PR
Cement Co. profits
decreased; other
plants show a loss
SOE: state-owned enterprise; AR: annual reports; PRDC: Puerto Rico Development Company;
PRIDCO: Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company.
Note: Fiscal years: 1 July-30 June.
Source: Author’s own data, based on PR government reports (1943, p. 47; 1944, p. 31; 1945, pp. 30-31;
1946, pp. 38-39; 1947, pp. 93-97; 1948, p. 60; 1949, pp. 60-65; 1950, pp. 88-90).
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In fact, the shoe and leather factory was sold to Joyce of California in
October 1949. However, more negotiations were needed before the privati-
sation policy could finally proceed.
As early as May 194814, PRIDCO received an offer to buy all its five operating
subsidiaries, from a group headed by Royal Little, president of Textron. This
proposal divided the subsidiaries into two groups –– one formed by the cement
plant, and the other formed by the remaining four. The proposal included:
(1) payments in cash for prepaid items and inventories; (2) the payment of
U.S.$3,000,000 in cash for the cement plant (or alternatively a lease for 6 years
at a rental of U.S.$500,000 per year, and U.S.$100,000 per year thereafter for
93 years); and (3) the payment of the depreciated value of the four other plants
over 10 years with 3 per cent interest payable quarterly15. This proposal would
have resulted in a payment well below the net investment made by PRIDCO in
the subsidiaries, which had been set as the minimum sum to be met for the
approval of any sale, and accordingly it was turned down.
Even though the Puerto Rican government would not make any official
statement on its willingness to privatise PRIDCO subsidiaries before the
gubernatorial election of November 1948, the question of privatisation was
debated publicly. In early July 1948, Luis Ferre´, one of the leaders of the
Statehood Party (and a member of the Ferre´ Group, a family industrial
holding that would be crucial later in the sale of the subsidiaries) made a
public statement asking that the firms be sold at auction, in which Puerto
Rican firms should participate16.
New proposals for the acquisition of the subsidiaries were soon forth-
coming. Following a conversation held with Moscoso on 1 February 1949,
David G. Baird (vice-president of Marsh & McLennan Inc.) sent PRIDCO a
formal bid to buy the cement, glass, paper and clay product companies17. One
week later, on 7 February 1949, Moscoso sent Baird’s letters to PRIDCO’s board
of directors, together with a memorandum stating his opinion that
«it is an operation to be studied in detaily. I want to let you know in
advance that our recommendation will probably be to ask for a higher
amount regarding the ‘going-concern value’ of all plants. Perhaps one
or two million dollars in addition to the millions offered. Furthermore,
the accumulated deficits must be absorbed by the company that buys
the plants.»18
14 That is, long before the proposal for the acquisition of the paperboard plant made by Karl F.
Landegger by the end of 1949, which is considered by Ross (1966, p. 115) as the first formal proposal
to buy a PRIDCO subsidiary.
15 PRIDCO, Proposal for the sale of subsidiaries. All the details of the proposal can be found in
this PRIDCO internal memorandum.
16 El Mundo, 7 July 1948, p. 1.
17 Details of this proposal can be found in Baird, Letter to PRIDCO.
18 PRIDCO, Memorandum from Teodoro Moscoso (author’s translation).
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No agreement was reached between PRIDCO and Baird, but the sub-
sidiaries would soon be privatised. In October 1949, PRIDCO sold the PR
Shoe and Leather Co. to Joyce de Puerto Rico Inc., a subsidiary of Joyce of
California. Joyce purchased the machinery for U.S.$35,00019. More impor-
tantly, at the end of 1949 the New York businessman Karl F. Landegger
showed an interest in acquiring the paper plant. In July 1950, he submitted a
formal bid for the acquisition of all four subsidiaries still under PRIDCO
ownership (cement, glass, paper, clay products). The nominal price he
offered was U.S.$10,000,000, to be paid in 10 years. However, Landegger
offered only U.S.$2,000,000 as a down payment and an interest-free mort-
gage20. Although the total amount offered was close to the book value of the
plants, the interest-free mortgage made the proposal far less attractive, and
PRIDCO did not accept it.
The final step was in late September 1950, when the Puerto Rican Ferre´
Group unexpectedly21 offered U.S.$10,500,000, to be paid as follows: a
down payment of U.S.$2,000,000, 3.5 per cent preferred stock of another
U.S.$2,000,000, and a 4 per cent first mortgage of U.S.$6,500,00022. This
proposal was the first to meet PRIDCO’s demands in full, and an agreement
was reached less than 1 week after intense negotiations between the tech-
nical teams of PRIDCO and the Ferre´ Group to work out the details23. On
3 October, the official agreement to sell the cement, glass, paper and clay
products companies to the Ferre´ Group was publicly announced24.
The total amount agreed for the sale, U.S.$10,500,000, was slightly above
the book value of PRIDCO’s subsidiaries25. The quantitative significance of
the sale can hardly be understated. Proceeds from privatisation amounted
to 9.3 per cent of fiscal receipts for the island’s government purposes, and
to 1.4 per cent of Puerto Rico’s total gross product in 195026. PRIDCO saw
the operation as a «commercial deal that, from the point of view of valua-
tions and economic consequences involved, may be classified among the
19 Joyce agreed to add at least U.S.$65,000 worth of additional machinery, and took over the
factory building on a lease basis (PRIDCO 1950, p. 36). Full details of the operations can be found in
PRIDCO (1950, p. 20).
20 See further details of Landegger’s proposal in Ross (1966, p. 115).
21 While PRIDCO was still considering the possibility of selling the firms to Landegger if he
improved his offer, the Ferre´ Group asked Martin Mun˜oz to withhold any final decision until that
holding could make an offer for PRIDCO subsidiaries; Mun˜oz complied with this request (Mun˜oz
Marı´n 1992, p. 252).
22 Taking everything into account, the Ferre´ proposal amounted to U.S.$3,000,000 over the bid
offered by Landegger (Ross, 1966, p. 116).
23 Maldonado (1997, pp. 65-68) offers a vivid account of this negotiation process.
24 El Mundo, 4 October 1950, pp. 1 and 15; El Imparcial, 4 October 1950, pp. 2 and 34.
25 Note that the PR Shoe and Leather had already been sold to Joyce in November 1949, well
before this agreement was reached.
26 I have made these computations based on the data in Puerto Rico Planning Board (1951) on
fiscal receipts (p. 79, Table 46), and gross product (p. 162, Appendix Table 14).
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most important ever made in the history of Puerto Rico»27. Indeed, the
relevance of proceeds from privatisation with respect to fiscal receipts (9.3
per cent) was much higher than that obtained between 1934 and 1937 in
Nazi Germany, which averaged 1.4 per cent per year (Bel 2010), and in
Fascist Italy between 1922 and 1925 (Bel forthcoming). In the same way, the
relevance of proceeds from privatisation with respect to fiscal receipts in
Puerto Rico was higher than in most EU-15 countries during Europe’s most
intense period of privatisation (1997-2000)28.
4. ANALYSIS OF THE OBJECTIVES OF PRIVATISATION
IN PUERTO RICO
Contemporary authors paid little attention to the reasons why Puerto
Rico’s government privatised the manufacturing firms under its ownership.
In 1954, a few years after privatisation had been implemented, Ojuda (1954,
pp. 161-162) emphasised the economic and technical difficulties faced by
most subsidiaries in undertaking successful operations (such as the market
dimension and changes in the economic environment with the resumption of
trade) as drivers of the sale. However, in an article published in 1955, Lewis
(1955, pp. 625-627) stressed managerial incapacity as one of the reasons for
the sale, as well as the view that government-owned firms would produce a
dangerous increase in the island’s wage structure because they paid higher
wages than private firms. Two years later, in 1957, Ross (1957, pp. 88-89; 1966,
pp. 108-117) refuted Lewis’s views by emphasising that managerial incapacity
was not an issue in the sale; Ross’s reasoning was more in line with Ojuda’s view
that the sale of the subsidiaries was due to problems related to the dimension of
the local market and to the economic environment.
Some of the contemporary analyses written in the 1960s are valuable, but
the authors of these studies lacked the theories, concepts and tools supplied
by recent literature. Theoretical developments have provided valuable
hypotheses on the motivations of politicians choosing between public own-
ership and privatisation (Shleifer and Vishny 1994; Boycko et al. 1996;
Bel and Calzada 2009), and have identified different objectives linked to
privatisation policies (Vickers and Yarrow 1988, 1991). On the one hand,
both the theoretical and the empirical literature have provided interesting
results regarding the use of privatisation to obtain political support (Perotti
1995; Biais and Perotti 2002; Bortolotti et al. 2003; Bel and Fageda 2009). On
the other, international evidence shows that financial motivations have also
27 PRIDCO (1951, p. 15, author’s translation). The recovery of the capital used to establish the
firms was later confirmed by the Puerto Rico Planning Board (1952, p. 38).
28 The figures for EU-15 countries in 1997-2000 can be obtained by combining data on priva-
tisation receipts from Clifton et al. (2003, p. 95) and data on fiscal receipts from Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (2005).
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been a key factor in recent privatisations (Yarrow 1999; Bortolotti and
Milella 2008).
In all, the analyses of more recent privatisation experiences in the fields of
economics and public policy have shown that privatisation policies may pursue
a multiplicity of objectives, among which three types stand out: ideological
motivations, political interests and economic objectives (either financial or
efficiency-related). By using these concepts and tools, a deeper and systematic
analysis of the objectives of privatisation in Puerto Rico can be undertaken.
4.1. Ideological Motivations
Ideology played an important role in the building of the SOE sector in
Puerto Rico. In line with the belief (commonly held in the late 1930s and
early 1940s) that private initiative would not effectively engage in the
industrialisation of Puerto Rico, Rexford Tugwell was firmly convinced of
the importance of public intervention in the economy. Tugwell held impor-
tant posts in the U.S. Department of Agriculture in the mid-1930s, and the
proposals he tried to put forward won him the nickname «Rex the Red»
(Goodsell 1965, p. 165; Carr 1984, p. 67). Indeed, Tugwell’s faith in public
corporations and state-financed industry was one of the main drivers of the
creation of the SOE sector in Puerto Rico (Carr 1984, p. 65). To achieve his
objective, Tugwell enlisted the support of Mun˜oz Marı´n, the leading local
politician, and Moscoso, who became the leading local public servant in the
industrial sector. However, Tugwell’s views on industrialisation were sub-
stantially to the left of those of Mun˜oz and Moscoso (Goodsell 1965, p. 190).
Indeed, the fact that Tugwell left the governorship in 1946 was seen as one of
the factors that made the industrial policy reorientation initiated after 1947
possible (Ross 1966, p. 79).
Particular attention should be paid to Mun˜oz Marı´n’s views on the issue
of public intervention and industrial development, because –– in addition to
being president of the Senate –– he was also the undisputed leader of the
PPD, and policy decisions were heavily dependent on him, particularly after
Tugwell left Puerto Rico in 1946. The fact that Mun˜oz Marı´n did not share
Tugwell’s faith in nationalisation is reflected in their disagreement over the
uncompleted nationalisation of the private telecommunications company.
Nationalising telecommunications was one of Tugwell’s most cherished
projects, but it failed because of Mun˜oz Marı´n’s lack of support. In 1947,
Tugwell’s public criticism of Mun˜oz Marı´n’s position on the expropriation
of telecommunications sparked fierce controversy. In a speech broadcast on
27 March 1947, Mun˜oz Marı´n responded
«I believe that investment of public funds directed to create more
sources of production, or to stimulate them, should have priority over
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public investmentsymerely directed to transfer property y I have
never believed in the wisdom of investing public funds to merely
transfer ownership to the government.»29
More on Mun˜oz Marı´n’s views on the private vs. public debate in eco-
nomics can be learnt from a speech given on the eve of the first election for
governor, in November 1948, when he stated that
«Men in the entire world fight, some defending private initiative,
others defending that the government should do everything y. We
cannot be doctrinaire y. The Puerto Rican government works based
on both doctrines, applying whichever one is more helpful in a parti-
cular moment. The government has created state-owned factories. But
it has helped to make many more private factoriesy. we are neither
theoretical nor doctrinaire.»30
Indeed, the privatisation policy itself provides clear proof that it did not
emerge out of any ideological conviction concerning the systematic super-
iority of private ownership. Not one agency owning and operating public
utilities or other network services (such as electricity, water or urban
transportation) was privatised either between 1948 and 1950, or during the
rest of Mun˜oz Marı´n’s tenure, which ended in 1964.
4.2. Political Interests
We should now turn our attention to the question of whether political
interests might have been the drivers of the privatisation policy. Recent
theoretical literature has shown that governments can design and implement
privatisation to foster their partisan political interests31. Furthermore, the
privatisation policy that preceded the one implemented in Puerto Rico –– the
large-scale sale of government-owned enterprises in Germany between 1934
and 1937 –– had clear political objectives, as well as financial ones. The Nazi
government had come to power with limited parliamentary support32;
as privatisation favoured private property, the Nazis used it as a tool to
foster alliances with the great industrialists (Bel 2010). In Italy, Mussolini
29 Mun˜oz Marı´n, «La compra de telefo´nica», (in Mun˜oz Marı´n, 2005, pp. 321-324; author’s
translation).
30 Mun˜oz Marı´n, «Mi propo´sito es que el pueblo resuelva los difı´ciles problemas de su vida», (in
Mun˜oz Marı´n, 2005, pp. 644-667; author’s translation).
31 See Biais and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (1995) for theoretical analyses; see Bel and Fageda
(2009) and Bortolotti et al. (2003) for empirical information.
32 When Hitler was appointed chancellor in January 1933, the Nazi party had just 196 out of
584 seats (33.6 per cent) in the German Parliament. In the next election, in March 1933, the Nazis
obtained 44.5 per cent of the seats (Bel 2010).
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implemented a privatisation policy in 1922-1925 for largely the same reasons
(Bel forthcoming)33.
In Puerto Rico, however, there was no comparable scenario of political
weakness and limited parliamentary support when the privatisation pro-
gramme was implemented. In the first gubernatorial election ever held,
in 1948, Mun˜oz Marı´n obtained 61.2 per cent of the votes, and became the
first elected governor of Puerto Rico. The second most voted candidate
(belonging to a coalition of the Statehood Party, the Socialist Party and
the Reformist Party)34 obtained just 28.6 per cent of votes, and the third
candidate (the Independence Party) received 10.2 per cent35. As regards the
elections to the Legislature, Mun˜oz Marı´n’s PPD won all the senatorial and
representative districts. Mun˜oz Marı´n now held absolute control of both the
executive and the legislative branches, and he had no need of a coalition in
order to design and implement his industrial policies.
In addition to the government’s political strength in 1948, another strik-
ing factor sets the Puerto Rico experience apart from other large-scale pri-
vatisation processes implemented to favour business and political elites and
to benefit the government’s allies, such as Fascist Italy (Bel forthcoming),
Nazi Germany (Sweezy 1941; Merlin 1943; Bel 2010) or post-communist
Russia (Desai 2005; Guriev and Rachinsky 2005). The fact is that most of the
privatised firms (cement, glass, paper and clay products) were sold to the
Ferre´ Group, a family holding. One of the brothers who ran the group was
Luı´s Ferre´, a very important figure in the Statehood Party, and a long-
standing opponent of the government’s economic policy36. At no other time
in the history of privatisation has a government sold the bulk of the state-
owned manufacturing sector to an opposition political leader. This clearly
shows that the sale of the PRIDCO subsidiaries in Puerto Rico was far from
being a story of crony capitalism or of transferring government ownership to
close political allies in order to foster the government’s political interests37.
33 When Mussolini was appointed prime minister in October 1922, the Fascist Party had only
thirty-five seats in the national parliament out of 535 seats (6.5 per cent). Only three out of thirteen
ministers in Mussolini’s first cabinet were members of the Fascist Party.
34 The Socialist Party had advocated Puerto Rico’s integration in the United States for a long
time; this was one of the reasons for the emergence of this apparently paradoxical coalition.
Quintero Rivera (1977) and Garcı´a and Quintero Rivera (1986) contain analyses of the development
of working class organisations in Puerto Rico.
35 Data on the gubernatorial elections were obtained from the Comisio´n Estatal de Elecciones
of Puerto Rico (http://www.ceepur.org/, accessed on June 2, 2009).
36 In 1968, Luı´s Ferre´ became the first non-PPD governor of Puerto Rico, after 20 years of PPD
dominance (Mun˜oz Marı´n between 1948 and 1964, and Sa´nchez Vilella between 1964 and 1968).
37 As pointed out by a referee, selling firms to political opponents can be a way of gaining «non-
opposition» in Parliament on specific issues and is not per se a signal of government not fostering
political interests. In this case, however, it is sensible to believe that the government was not seeking
to gain «non-opposition» in Parliament, because Mun˜oz Marı´n’s PPD had won all the Senatorial and
Representative districts in the 1948 election, as stated above. Thus, absolutely all Puerto Rican
legislators were members of the ruling party.
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4.3. Economic Objectives
Given that ideological biases and partisan political interests did not play a
relevant role in privatisation in Puerto Rico, the island’s government appears to
have privatised in order to advance its economic policy. Even so, it is not as if
the Treasury was under great financial pressure (a key factor in most decisions
to privatise). The government’s public debt had fallen steadily throughout the
1940s, from U.S.$27.2 million in 1940 to U.S.$12.8 million in 1949 (this last
figure being 47 per cent of the 1940 level)38. Interestingly, the lowest level of
public debt was reached in 1947 (37 per cent of the 1940 figure), the year in
which the first negotiations for privatising PR Shoe and Leather began.
As for industrial policy –– the core of Puerto Rican economic policy ––
promoting industrialisation was a primary objective. However, taking into
account the large investment in the PRIDCO subsidiaries and the small
number of manufacturing jobs created (see Table 2), the amount of capital
required to build government factories able to increase production and jobs
to the level needed «vastly exceeded the amount available to the govern-
ment», according to Ross (1957, p. 90). In addition, it should be noted that
there were competing demands for public debt, because very large new bond
and long-term issues of the public corporations were made in 1949-1950,
most of which consisted of obligations of the Water Resources Authority and
the Aqueduct and Sewer Authority. Moreover, other government policies that
provided subsidies to private firms for establishing industries were much
more effective for industrial job creation: «While the government-operated
plants employ about 900 persons, they, with the fifty-two privately operated
industries started under the Aid Program, are expected to employ a total of
around 8,000 persons when their initial development and training programs
are completed» (PRIDCO 1949, p. 4).
Another important economic policy objective was to attract foreign
capital for the industrialisation process, particularly from the continental
United States (Perloff 1950, 1953, p. 51). In this respect, Lewis (1955, p. 625)
and Goldsmith et al. (1974, p. 144) stress that an important reason for aban-
doning nationalisation was to attract investors from the mainland.
Together with the growing impression that the government’s main
objectives could not be accomplished by means of a full policy of building
and operating publicly owned manufacturing firms, the increasing dis-
satisfaction with the performance of PRIDCO’s subsidiaries was probably
another key driver of privatisation. Taken as a whole, PRIDCO’s subsidiaries
were in the black, but only one corporation, PR Cement, was making a profit,
and the other four subsidiaries were making heavy losses. Table 4 gathers
together information on the profits and losses incurred by each corporation
between 1945 and 1950. It is plain to see that only the cement plant recorded
38 Puerto Rico Planning Board, Economic development, p. 81, Table 48.
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profits and that all the other corporations recorded major losses in each of
the years studied. Table 5 shows the statement of earned surplus of PRIDCO
subsidiaries in 1949 and 1950, the last years of public operation. As can be
seen, accumulated deficit in 1950 amounted to U.S.$1,978,361 (17.3 million
in 2010 U.S.$).
There was also considerable dissatisfaction with the performance of PR
Cement. A comparison of its performance with that of Ponce Cement –– a
private factory owned by the Ferre´ Group, which had begun production in
1942 –– is particularly revealing. In 1943, Ponce Cement’s first year of full
operation, its production had been 70.4 per cent of that of PR Cement, and
Puerto Rico had become a cement exporter in that year. In 1948, the year in
which the decision to privatise was firm, Ponce Cement’s production figures
were 38.1 per cent higher than those of PR Cement (Baralt 1996, p. 127). In
addition to the lead Ponce Cement had achieved in production, the differ-
ences in price were also an important factor and while Ponce Cement was
selling cement at U.S.$0.75 per sack PR Cement charged the Puerto Rican
government a price of U.S.$0.95 (Baralt 1996, p. 177).
The comparison between these two cement factories is important within our
context, because the other PRIDCO subsidiaries did not have any competitors
on the island (although they faced increasing competition from firms on the
TABLE 4
NET PROFIT (U.S.$)/(LOSS) OF PRIDCO CORPORATIONS, 1945-1950
(FISCAL YEAR 1 JULY-30 JUNE)
Corporation 1945-46 1946-47 1947-48 1948-49 1949-50
PR Cementa 457,477 499,643 1,107,308 1,271,735 758,051
PR Glass (138,615) (138,634) (518,949) (316,367) (174,573)
PR Pulp and Paper – (41,492) (271,328)b (228,670)c In liquidationd
PR Shoe and Leather – (47,580) (123,596) (24,505)
PR Clay Products – – (155,000) (112,538) (114,900)
Notes: aUntil 1944-45, the only subsidiary fully in operation was PR Cement Co. Its profits had been
U.S.$493,865.78 (1942-43), U.S.$492,674.47 (1943-44), and U.S.$247,908.78 (1944–45).
bNo specific figures for the losses of PR Pulp and Paper Co. and PR Shoe and Leather Co. in 1947-48
were provided. This figure is my own computation for the joint losses based on data in PRIDCO (1948). I
found that net loss between July 1 1947 and April 30 1948 for each company was: 173,462 –– PR Pulp and
Paper –– and 20,751 –– PR Shoe and Leather –– (data from Travieso, Information on Subsidiaries’ Results).
In fact, the loss for the whole fiscal year must have been higher, as the joint computation made for the two
subsidiaries shows.
cThis figure is my own computation based on information in PRIDCO (1949, pp. 20, 22, 26, 28 29
and 36).
dIn August 1949, the board of directors of the PR Pulp and Paper Corporation decided to close down
the plant and the corporation went into liquidation.
Sources: Author’s own data, based on PRIDCO Annual Reports 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950.
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U.S. mainland). Puerto Rican policymakers were fully aware of the differences
in efficiency and productivity between the cement factories, and of the overall
inefficiency of PR Cement, as shown by a confidential report produced by
PRIDCO in September 1947 –– Report on Puerto Rico Cement performance and
productivity –– a copy of which was addressed to Mun˜oz Marı´n:
1) Whereas the cost of living increased by 53.8 per cent between 1941
and 1947, the average hourly wage at the Puerto Rico Cement Plant
increased by 192 per cent in the same period. Whereas the average
weekly wage increased by 164 per cent (p. 3), (monetary) labour
productivity increased by just 48.5 per cent in the period (p. 4).
2) The annual salary paid at PR Cement was higher than that paid to the
island’s policemen (first class; by 25.23 per cent), to the island’s
firefighters (first class; by 87.8 per cent) and to school teachers (by
30.68 per cent) (p. 6).
3) The hourly wage at PR Cement was around 25 per cent higher than in
other industrial sectors on the island (p. 9).
4) The hourly wage at PR Cement was around 35.85 per cent higher
than at PR Glass, and 87.88 per cent higher than at PR Pulp and Paper
(pp. 10-11).
TABLE 5
EARNED SURPLUS (U.S.$)/(DEFICIT) OF PRIDCO SUBSIDIARIES, 1949 AND 1950
Corporation 1949 1950 Increase
PR Cementa 1,527,031 1,472,245 54,786
PR Glass (1,221,859) (1,371,497) (149,638)
PR Pulp and Paperb (701,220) (882,376) (181,157)
PR Shoe and Leatherb (211,920) (497,756) (285,836)
PR Clay Productsb (435,972) (780,971) (344,999)
Telares PR (78,569) (79,999) (1,430)
Other combined surplus, other credits and
other debits
598,829 161,993 (436,903)
Total earned surplus/(deficit) (523,680) (1,978,361) (1,454,681)
PRIDCO: Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company.
Notes: aThe decrease in the surplus of PR Cement Co. is due to the fact that profits for the year 1950
were scarcely above 50 per cent of the previous year. Nevertheless, PR Cement Co. paid the parent
company dividends to the tune of U.S.$800,000.
bThe increase in the deficit of PR Pulp and Paper Co., PR Shoe and Leather Co., and PR Clay Products Co.
is partly due to the fact that in those corporations the research and development costs were written off.
Sources: Author’s own data, based on PRIDCO Annual Report 1950.
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5) The average weekly wage paid at PR Cement was 20.96 per cent
higher than at the Ponce Cement plant. PR Cement employed 24 per
cent more workers than Ponce Cement (even though Ponce produced
more cement). Efficiency measured as labour productivity at Ponce
Cement was 31 per cent higher (p. 12).
The points stressed in this report provide a depressing image of PR
Cement’s efficiency and productivity and must have made a lasting impres-
sion on Puerto Rican policymakers39. The situation raised two particular
concerns. First, the wage policy in PRIDCO’s subsidiaries needed reforms in
order to make them profitable, but PRIDCO’s managers could never deal
satisfactorily with this issue because of its political repercussions (Moscoso
1953, p. 61)40. Second, wages paid to PRIDCO’s manufacturing workers,
especially those in PR Cement, were pushing industrial salaries in Puerto
Rico upwards, with negative effects on the island’s competitiveness and its
ability to attract foreign investment (Lewis 1955, p. 627)41.
In stark contrast to the government’s plants, the Ferre´ Group’s companies
had a fine record of productive efficiency (Mun˜oz Marı´n 1992, p. 253).
Furthermore, Mun˜oz Marı´n saw Jose´ Ferre´, the head of the family business,
as an exemplary Puerto Rico entrepreneur, the very opposite of the wide-
spread model of absentee owner that –– to his mind –– had been one of the
main obstacles to the success of local industrialisation42. These factors,
39 As mentioned above, the absence of private competitors for the manufacturing subsidiaries
other than cement makes it impossible to compare public vs. private efficiency before privatisation
any further. In the same way, the lack of data for the post-privatisation period makes it impossible to
compare the pre- and post-privatisation performance of the subsidiaries sold to the Ferre´ Group.
Nevertheless, some comparison on productivity can be made for the case of PR Shoe and Leather,
which was sold to Joyce of Puerto Rico in 1949. The productivity per worker at the end of fiscal year
1947-1948 (June 1948) was 2.8 pairs of shoes per day (computation based on production data from
PRIDCO (1949, p. 26); data on the workforce in Table 2). In the last month of fiscal year 1950 (June
1950), already under private management, production was 3.5 pairs of shoes per worker per day
(computation based on data in PRIDCO 1950, p. 20). In any case, it is worth noting that this
information was not available at the time privatisation was decided.
40 He also stressed the fact that, even though the government factories were organised as
corporations, PRIDCO had many responsibilities to different government agencies. Because of the
lack of coordination between the departments of the government, the burden of compliance was
excessive (p. 68).
41 The effect of wages on industrial competitiveness was an important concern for PRIDCO’s
top management. Following the Democratic victory in the 1948 U.S. presidential and legislative
election (supported by the PPD), Moscoso sent a memorandum to Pin˜ero, Mu´n˜oz Marı´n, and Ferno´s
Isern (Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico) stating that «the industrialization program may be
absolutely destroyed if Puerto Rico is not allowed to maintain the privilege held until now of
establishing minimum wages through industrial committees». Taking for granted that the Demo-
cratic victory would result in an increase of the minimum wage in the United States, Moscoso added
«there will be pressure to fully include Puerto Rico in the federal law. Should this happen, the
industrialization program would be immediately terminated.» (Moscoso. Memorandum to Jesu´s T.
Pin˜ero, Luis Mu´n˜oz Marı´n, and A. Ferno´s Isern; author’s translation).
42 This can be seen in Mun˜oz Marı´n, Memorias. I owe this insight to Silvia A´lvarez Curbielo.
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together with the fact that the bid submitted by the Ferre´ Group was the best
received for the PRIDCO subsidiaries, explains how and why the sale of the
four remaining factories was decided in October 1950.
In 1950, the industrial development programme was reorganised. The
Economic Development Administration (EDA) was created as a regular
department of the Puerto Rican government, operating with funds assigned
annually by the Legislature. The proceeds obtained from the sale of PRID-
CO’s subsidiaries were used to promote EDA’s activities, and a new phase of
industrial policy in Puerto Rico –– the analysis of which is beyond the scope
of this paper –– became consolidated43.
5. CONCLUSION
A large SOE sector was created in Puerto Rico in the 1940s, a period in
which the island’s governor was still appointed by the U.S. President. Several
public services were nationalised and manufacturing SOEs were created to
produce cement, glass, shoes, paper and clay products. Between 1948 and 1950,
the first elected government in Puerto Rico privatised the manufacturing SOEs,
thus implementing the first large-scale privatisation policy in a democracy.
This study contributes to the literature by documenting the privatisation
process in Puerto Rico, and by analysing the roles played by ideology, political
interests and economic objectives in the decision to privatise. Ideological bias
and partisan political objectives do not appear to have driven privatisation in
Puerto Rico. Unfortunately, the economic and financial information for the
manufacturing SOEs is limited. However, the available data suggest that prag-
matic economic concerns, related to the performance of the government’s
manufacturing firms, together with the need to attract private investment to
foster industrialisation in the island, seem to have been the main forces behind it.
At the end of the 1940s, Puerto Rico’s policymakers applied a highly practical
approach to their policies for promoting industrialisation. Increasing dis-
satisfaction with the performance of the manufacturing SOEs, together with
43 Most of the papers published in the monograph «Puerto Rico. A study in Democratic
Development» (Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science; vol. 285, January
1953) emphasized the highly successful results of this strategy in the short run. These results
probably contributed to Mun˜oz Marı´n’s performance in the 1952 gubernatorial election, when he
polled 64.9 per cent of the votes, an all-time high. The Independent Party came second, with 19 per
cent. The two parties that had come second in 1948 running as a coalition fared very badly in 1952:
the Statehood Party obtained only 12.9 per cent, and the Socialist Party 3.3 per cent. Mun˜oz Marı´n
retained strong electoral support through his entire career as governor: in the 1960 election, the last
time he ran, he obtained 58.2 per cent of votes. In 1964, his successor as PPD candidate, Sa´nchez
Vilella, obtained 59.2 per cent. This said, it is worth noting that other analyses of the bootstrap
strategy are more critical. For instance, Weisskoff (1985) points out that with that strategy the field
was left to whoever wanted to use relatively cheap labor and take advantage of the tax evasion and
transfer pricing schemes, eventually creating problems of high unemployment and little net labor
opportunity.
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improved opportunities for stimulating privately induced industrialisation, sug-
gested that the experiment of government-owned manufacturing firms should be
terminated. A strong political leadership was able to deliver this policy reform.
To conclude, it is worth stressing that privatisation in Puerto Rico was far
from being a story of crony capitalism or of coalition building to foster the
government’s political interests. It diverged radically from the previous
instances of a policy of privatisation implemented between 1922 and 1925 by
the Fascist government in Italy, and between 1934 and 1937 by the Nazi
government in Germany. Democracy, which implies checks and balances,
transparency, and public scrutiny, may well provide an environment that is
less prone to corruption and less politically tainted privatisation than a
dictatorship. Future research should undertake a more thorough study of the
differences between privatisation under democracy and under a dictatorship.
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